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A very different experience: Merchant Seamen on British 
coastal convoys 1940-45 
 
Coastal Convoys: Introduction and Literature Review 
 
Since the early 1940s academic and public understandings of the war at sea in 
Europe have been dominated by the struggle for control of the Atlantic sealanes.    
Images and narratives of U-boats versus the escorted, seried columns of merchant 
ships in carefully controlled and closely fought convoy actions in the Atlantic 
proliferate in media representations.  The British Government’s belated decision in 
2012 to award veterans of the Russian convoys a special campaign medal in the 
form of the Arctic Star had only minimal impact on public perceptions of the 
geographical confines of Britain’s sea war.1 While within academic opinion there is a 
very firm understanding that the war at sea, especially the merchant seamen’s war, 
was very different in the Atlantic, as opposed to the Mediterranean, Pacific and 
Arctic theatres of operation, one area of convoy operations in the Second World War 
continues to be seriously overlooked by both academics and the general public: the 
convoys which operated in UK coastal waters.  While the Atlantic justifiably has 
taken the lion’s share of public and academic attention (it was on this critical and 
closely contested campaign that Britain’s survival depended from 1939 to 1945) the 
significance of the coastal convoys merits greater attention than they have hitherto 
received.  As Richard Woodman has commented the coastal convoys remain ‘one of 
the many disregarded elements in Britain’s maritime struggle’.2  The lack of 
academic inquiry into the wartime coastal convoys constitutes a surprising and very 
serious gap in the literature of the Second World War, the history of the British 
Merchant Navy and the narratives of many of the maritime communities along the 
East Coast of the United Kingdom.  Put simply the coastal convoys were equally 
critical to Britain’s survival as the Atlantic convoys from 1940 to 1944.  They 
produced a very different set of strategic and tactical problems for both sides in the 
war at sea that has not been studied in any depth.  In turn, the tactical and strategic 
problems of coastal convoys meant a significantly different wartime experiences for 
the merchant navy crews trying to fight their ships through to destinations on the 
South and East Coasts of the United Kingdom.  As we try to refine and add detail to 
our understanding of the merchant seamen’s experience in the Second World War, 
the nature of the war at sea, and the life of seafarers in those communities that 
produced the coaster crews, it is essential to interrogate and establish such 
differences in substantially greater depth.  The nature of the war at sea in European 
waters cannot be understood without a fuller appreciation of the role and 
importance of coastal convoys. 
 
During the war comparatively little was done to bring the efforts of merchant 
seamen on the coastal runs to public attention and that has fed through into 
academic writing about the war at sea.3  For example, although British Pathé 
newsreels covered the Luftwaffe’s kanalkampf against the East coast convoys in July 
1940 it was the brilliance of the Spitfire pilots, rather than the stoicism of merchant 
navy crews, that was celebrated.4  At least in covering the use of German shore 
artillery against the coastal convoys in August 1940 Pathé made reference to the 
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‘superb seamanship and indomitable courage’ which allowed the coastal convoys to 
fight through the barrage.5  Similarly, by the end of 1944 the Ministry of Information 
had published pamphlets covering the achievements of Coastal Command, 
Combined Operations 1940-42, The Campaign in Greece and Crete, Fleet Air Arm, 
Eighth Army, His Majesty’s Minesweepers and a dozen other titles.  Some of them 
briefly touched on the subject of coastal convoys.  For example, the bravery of 
Marine W.C. Prescott in continuing to fire the 4-inch gun of the SS Terlings against 
incoming enemy aircraft even as the vessel slipped beneath the English Channel, 
was recognised by the award of a Lloyd’s War Medal for bravery and celebrated in 
the Ministry of Information’s guide to the achievements of The Royal Marines 
published in 1944.6  However, in terms of recognising the bravery of merchant 
seamen on the coastal runs it was not until 1947 that the title British Coaster, 1939-
45  was published.7    It is not surprising that one surviving veteran has commented: 
‘These Coastal Convoys have "slipped through the net" of History. The Atlantic and 
Mediterranean ones are well-known in story and documentary, but the coastals are 
literally unknown, even to RN sailors who served on the ocean convoy routes’.8 Lost 
in history, they remain almost totally overlooked by serious academic historians. 
 
Comparatively little has been written about British coastal convoys of the Second 
World War, and almost nothing on the operation of Axis coastal convoys in North 
European and Mediterranean waters.  This leaves a significant gap in our 
understanding of wartime strategy, logistics, military operations and the experiences 
of merchant seamen in the midst of the Second World War.   For the British coastal 
convoys much of what has appeared has been directed at the market for popular 
histories of the Second World War, and the flaws of such works are considerable 
both in access to sources and levels of analysis. Alexander McKee’s The Coal Scuttle 
Brigade written in the 1950s before sources in the National Archives (Public Record 
Office) were open to researchers, was an early attempt to focus attention on the 
coastal convoys.9  McKee expressed his surprise in the foreword to his book that 
‘some of the fiercest convoy battles of the war could take place literally on England’s 
doorstep… and yet remain almost unknown’.10  Ten years later, Smith’s Hold the 
Narrow Sea: Naval Warfare in the English Channel 1939-1945 documented key 
events in the story of the Coastal Convoys while providing little overall analysis.11  
The Battle of the East Coast  by J.P. Foynes in 1994 delivered a compendium of 
detail, but as a self-published book its impact on both academic and popular opinion 
was minimal.12  Robert Jackson’s 1995 study, Churchill’s Moat: The Channel War 
1939-1945 covered coastal convoys as part of a wider narrative of warfare in the 
narrow seas between Britain and France.13  While most general histories of the 
Second World War at sea have ignored the story of the smaller ships Alan Burn’s 
The Fighting Commodores: The Convoy Commanders in the Second World War at 
least devoted a chapter to the coastal commodores.14  Finally Nick Hewitt’s book 
Coastal Convoys 1939-1945  in 2008 gave some overview but was very much aimed 
at the popular market.15  Beyond this, coastal convoys have featured as the 
backdrop to naval engagements in histories of British and German coastal forces.16  
The lack of writing on the coastal convoys belies the importance of the coastal trade 
before the war and during it.  By contrast with the writing on the Second World War 
there has been significantly more, and better quality writing, on coastal warfare and 
convoying off the shores of the United Kingdom before 1939.17  Without the small 
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ships plying their trade along the coasts of the United Kingdom the British economy 
simply could not function efficiently. That trading and economic reality potentially 
opened up some interesting possibilities for any state going to war with Great Britain. 
 
Coastal Convoys: Function and Importance 
On the outbreak of the Second World War the portion of the British fleet employed 
in home waters was significant.  In 1937 1,479 steam and motor vessels totalling 
1,151,880 grt and employing 21,324 British and 261 foreign seamen were primarily 
engaged in the British coasting trade.18  Convoying on the coastal routes was 
introduced in 1939, but became truly significant after the Fall of France which added 
greatly to the strategic significance of short sea traffic around the coast of the 
United Kingdom.  With Britain on the brink of defeat, and Germany able to establish 
air and sea bases along the Channel coast, it was apparent that East coast convoys 
were particularly vulnerable to attack and disruption.  Bringing convoys through the 
Dover-Calais narrows was abandoned.  However, such was the on-going 
requirement for coal in the South East (approximately 40,000 tons per week) that 
convoys would have to run on six days out of seven from the Firth of Forth to the 
Thames estuary.19  If they could be stopped the British war economy would be 
paralysed. 
 
During the war the coastal convoys fulfilled two significant strategic functions in 
terms of the British economy: Firstly they brought coal from the North East England 
and Wales to the South East of England (for the purposes of heating homes and 
fuelling the power stations vital to maintain British war industries).  In 1852 William 
Cory had initiated the use of steam colliers to bring coal into the capital.  Coal 
carried by sea quickly came to dominate the London market, and the growth of 
power-intensive industries in the capital such as heavy engineering, chemicals, 
shipbuilding and armaments was fuelled by plentiful supplies of coal.20  From the 
mid-nineteenth century onwards in time of war the supply of coal via the coastal 
route had to be maintained if the domestic energy supplies, and industrial output, of 
the capital were to be maintained. 
 
The second strategic function of the coastal convoys was that they eased the burden 
on West coast ports and the rail network, by facilitating the West to East movement 
of cargoes from larger vessels that had crossed the North Atlantic.  In September 
1940, as the Luftwaffe switched its attention to the capital, ocean-going ships were 
barred from entering the Port of London, and although this was relaxed in January 
1941 strict limitations were placed on their number in the river at any one time 
(50).21  On 10 September the Admiralty placed a limitation restricting the Humber 
ports to ships of no more than 6,500 gross registered tons, and prohibited the use of 
the ports to the south of the river except to coasters.  With cargoes destined for the 
East coast and London arriving at West coast ports (Liverpool, Bristol etc) other 
means would have to be found to transport them to their destination.  This resulted 
in dramatic changes in demand in the logistical networks on which Britain’s survival 
depended.  For example, before the war 80% of cargoes entering the Port of 
Liverpool had reached their destinations via short road journey (12% via rail).  By 
1944 almost 30% of cargoes entering the port of Liverpool were transported onward 
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by rail, with the result that the United Kingdom rail network was under severe strain.  
The strain on the logistical network, and a developing crisis of imports, led in 
January 1941 to the Admiralty allowing ships of up to 8,500 grt on the East Coast 
run.22  
 
Incorporating ships (under 8,500 grt) that had made the Atlantic run into coastal 
convoys offered one means to ease the burden: so too did the transhipment of 
cargoes from larger ships into small coasting vessels.  This could be done in port or 
in sheltered anchorages using the derricks of the larger ships.  With both coal 
deliveries and the onward transhipment of cargoes that had crossed the Atlantic the 
coastal convoys played a vital role in alleviating the pressure on UK ports.  
Transhipping cargoes to coasters meant that smaller ports, closer to the point of use 
could be utilised, lessening demand on the big ports in the West. As Hancock and 
Gowing noted in British War Economy ‘if the east coast ports had been completely 
closed, there would have been severe port congestion. As it was, elimination of port 
delays was one of the most promising methods of improving the carrying capacity of 
British ships’.23 Coastal convoys were essential from 1940 to 1942 in preventing a 
shipping and import crisis through port delay. 
 
 
Coastal Convoys: Threats 
Despite some operations by German U-boats in the North Sea in 1939 and 1940, the 
Fall of France transformed the strategic position of the Kriegsmarine.  U-boat bases 
were established on the French Atlantic at places such as Lorient, Brest and St 
Nazaire.  In the shallow waters of the English Channel submarines were relatively 
easy prey for anti-submarine vessels.  In such waters the offensive against the 
coastal convoys would be carried by the Luftwaffe, and by the smaller fighting ships 
of the Kriegsmarine.  The Schnellboote (S-Boats) of the German Navy were 
particularly important in this latter group.  Armed with two torpedo tubes and two 
reloads, together with mines, cannon and machine guns, and capable of speeds of 
up to 45 knots, they represented a formidable threat in the waters of the English 
Channel.  Based along the Channel coast from Ijmuiden to Cherbourg the S-Boat 
came into its own as a weapon against coastal convoys from June 1940 onwards.  
 
In 1940 S-Boats, sometimes assisted by the Luftwaffe, scored some significant 
successes against coastal convoys.  Although the number of operational S-Boats was 
low (some ten to fifteen craft) the British found them hard to deal with.  As Captain 
Roskill recorded in the Royal Navy’s official history of The War at Sea: ‘not only were 
they hard to sight while lying in wait on the convoy routes by night, but our escort 
vessels were too slow to catch and destroy them’.24 In the second half of 1940 
twenty-three ships totalling 47,985 tons were lost to S-Boat attacks by torpedo with 
others being lost to the bombs of the Luftwaffe and seamines laid by aircraft and 
vessels.25 
 
For example, convoy CW8, passing westbound through the Straits of Dover on 25 
July 1940, was badly attacked losing five merchant ships to bombs (two escorting 
destroyers and four other merchant vessels damaged).26  The following day the 
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remains of the convoy were attacked by S-boats which claimed three further victims.  
Only eleven ships of CW8 passed Dungeness.27   The following convoy CW9, with 25 
ships, was similarly heavily engaged when it passed westbound through the Straits 
of Dover on the afternoon of 7 August 1940. It was attacked by S-boats that night, 
losing three ships.  Badly disorganised by the attack the convoy was straggled out 
over a distance of about ten miles.  Luftwaffe bombers attempted to pick off the 
stragglers, but RAF fighter aircraft from No.145 Squadron managed to prevent the 
enemy bombers from sinking any more ships.28  The attack on Channel convoys in 
the summer of 1940 demonstrated the potential impact of combined Luftwaffe-
Kriegsmarine activity against highly vulnerable coastal routes.  The German Naval 
High Command noted the expressions of alarm in the British press with considerable 
satisfaction: ‘The British press and propaganda has a great deal to say on the 
activities of our … [S-]boats.  Announcements reveal that the enemy realizes the 
great danger represented by this weapon’.29 
 
During 1939 and 1941 bomb, mine and torpedo took a steady toll on the coastal 
convoys, but a series of breakthroughs and events kept the losses within 
manageable levels. This was in part down to the failure of Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine 
co-operation in the attack on shipping.  Despite the successes against CW8 and CW9 
in 1940 the Luftwaffe (or more accurately its head) remained largely uninterested in 
working with the Kriegsmarine.30  Something around a third of the mines available 
for use against the coastal convoys were instead dropped on land targets because of 
their greater explosive yield.31   In the six months up until the end of February 1940 
German mines sank 89 ships in British coastal waters.32 However, the recovery of a 
German magnetic mine in November 1939 enabled the British to implement counter-
measures in the form of degaussing in 1940.  Even so it was not until early 1941 
that losses due to German mines declined to just a handful of sinkings per month.  
The winter of 1940-41 had represented a vital window of opportunity to attack the 
coastal convoys.  As Sönke Neitzel has argued: ‘If the Luftwaffe and the navy had 
agreed on a common strategy it could have weakened Great Britain to a 
considerable extent in 1940/41 when the Luftwaffe still had large resources 
available’.33  At the end of 1940, in reviewing the effectiveness of Luftwaffe bombing 
attacks against ships in UK waters, there was some satisfaction within the Admiralty 
that attacks by the German Air Force had proved less effective than had been 
expected after the CW8 debacle.34  In the spring of 1941 many Luftwaffe units were 
relocated to the East in preparation for the launch of operation Barbarossa on 22 
June 1941.  At the same time, the S-Boat threat was partly countered by the 
development of British coastal forces, and in particular the motor gun boat [MGB] 
during 1941.   The MGB was proclaimed as ‘Britain’s answer’ to the S-Boats.35   
Developments in shore and ship-based radar, developments in the use of aircraft 
against S-Boats put increasing pressure on the S-Boat arm. As Captain S.W. Roskill 
wrote in volume 2 of the official history of the war at sea, by 1942:  
 
The patrol line of motor gunboats and motor launches . . . [was] established 
some eight miles to seaward of the shipping lanes . . . Our short-wave shore 
radar and the ‘Very High Frequency’ wireless stations now played a big part in 
keeping the patrol craft informed of enemy movements. By the end of the 
year [1942] the whole of the Nore Command’s coastal area was covered by 
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these radar beams, and the enemy could be detected and plotted while still 
some twenty miles offshore; and added to this great advantage was the fact 
that radar sets were now being fitted in the Coastal Force vessels 
themselves.36 
 
Despite the growing effectiveness of Britain’s defences on the East coast, the S-Boat 
campaign held up remarkably well until 1942, partly helped by a switch in the 
emphasis of the campaign to the convoys along the South Coast.37 
 
Although the Royal Navy and RAF Coastal Command steadily built up their patrol 
network in the English Channel, enhancing the number of escort vessels and making 
more systematic use of electronic and other sources of intelligence, when S-Boats 
did attack a convoy the effect was devastating. When Convoy PW250 was attacked 
near the Eddystone light on 19 November 1942 by 6 S-Boats from the 5th Flotilla 
from Cherbourg three merchant ships were sunk together with an escorting armed-
whaler HMS Ullswater.   
 
Despite the attack on Convoy PW250 1942 represented a turning point.38  In 1943 
the S-Boat campaign against the coastal convoys collapsed, only seeing a revival in 
1944 as a result of increased traffic in the English Channel as a result of the D-Day 
landings.39 
 
S-Boat Success against Merchant Ships 1940-45 
 Year  Tonnage  Number of Ships 
 1940  47,985   23 
 1941  58,854   29 
 1942  71,156   23 
1943  15,138     6 
 1944  26,321   13 
 1945  10,222     540 
Coasters: The Ships 
The coasting vessels most commonly found in the coastal convoys were rather 
different from ocean-going vessels.  Coasters had smaller crews, fewer holds and 
more rudimentary facilities.  Reports from convoy commodores on the coastal run 
make fascinating reading. There are frequent expressions of disgust from former 
senior Royal Navy officers at the conditions they were expected to serve in on 
coasters (albeit briefly) while acting as commodore to a particular convoy.  Where a 
commodore found above average conditions he could be effusive in his praise.  For 
example, Commodore Mulhall was fulsome in his comments on the facilities on the 
SS Lea Grange in May 1944: ‘An unusually well-fitted collier; compasses good; speed 
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control excellent; Master and officers very efficient…; accommodation good – spare 
cabin, good chart room settee; spare cabin for signalmen; food very good’.41 
Suggestions from the Ministry of Shipping, Ministry of War Transport or Admiralty to 
coaster companies about how they might improve their vessels in the patriotic 
pursuit of victory were usually met with some suspicion if it potentially meant some 
expense on the part of the owners.42 
 
Part of the problem with coasters was that their design features were usually 
influenced by the type of waters in which they operated.  For example, the SS 
Fulham launched in 1935 by Fulham Borough Council to service the needs of its 
power station at Battersea Reach was designed to a flat iron configuration which 
meant minimal superstructure, and a hinged funnel, so that she could pass under 
bridges.  Capable of 10.5 knots fully loaded the SS Fulham had a maximum draught 
of 16 feet.43  The majority of coasters were small ships.  For example, the average 
size of the fourteen coasters managed by the London Power Company during the 
war was 1597 gross registered tons (smallest 1,222 grt: largest 2709 grt).  Five 
were lost (1 collision, 1 U-boat and 3 to S-boats) between 1940 and 1945.44  
Thirteen of the 21 ships managed by collier company William Cory and Son were lost 
during the war (7 to mines, 4 aircraft, 2 to S-boats) and they averaged 2184 grt 
smallest 911 grt: largest 3,431 grt).45 
 
Against the weapons of the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe the vessels of the coastal 
convoys mounted weapons which the crews felt were wholly inadequate. Coasters 
were less well-armed than bigger ships. They had fewer suitable locations for gun 
mountings, and decks and frames would have fewer possibilities for 'stiffening' to 
mount guns such as Bofors, 12 pounder or 4-inch. Coasters instead had to rely on a 
variety of machine guns such as the Lewis and Bren.  As one deckhand from the SS 
West Town later explained: ‘all that we had to protect us [from the S-boats] was a 
stripped down Lewis machine gun…. The trouble was they had several weapons to 
reply’.46   
 
Some of the machine guns fitted to coasters were of first world war vintage and of 
dubious reliability.  The 648 ton, 9 knot collier, SS Methilhill was rather better armed 
than many with a 12 pounder and two 1917 model .30 calibre Marlin machine guns 
on each of the bridge wings.  However, the crew despised the Marlin as ‘a very poor 
weapon really – it jammed – it seized up’.47 Similarly, the steam or compressed air 
powered Holman projector was another weapon typically fitted to coasters that their 
crews came to hate.  A pneumatic mortar designed to launch an explosive projectile, 
such as a hand grenade, into the air against low flying aircraft the Holman projector 
developed a reputation for unreliability.  A drop in pneumatic pressure could result in 
the projectile dropping back towards the ship’s deck before it had exploded.  For 
example, when convoy FN23 was attacked by aircraft on 15 July 1940 the SS Hull 
Trader tried to defend herself with her single Lewis gun and Holman projector.  The 
first hand grenade into the projector exploded injuring two members of the crew.48 
 
Anti-aircraft kites and balloons were similarly problematic for coaster crews.  During 
the summer of 1940 balloons were introduced on the coastal convoys.  Handled by 
the Mobile Balloon Barrage Flotilla they were intended to make life difficult for 
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Luftwaffe pilots seeking to attack the coastal convoys.49  Controlling the balloons 
was, however, very difficult and they were generally despised as more trouble than 
they were worth.50 Some masters appear to have been willing to turn a Nelsonian 
blind eye to instructions to raise balloons while in convoy.51  After the aerial attacks 
on coastal convoys in 1940 some Royal Navy officers came to the same conclusion 
as the collier crews that balloons were probably more trouble than they were worth 
in weather conditions where the cloud base was not unusually low.52 
 
The small crews on coasters meant a shortage of potential gunners for the available 
armament.  While larger ships benefitted from the provision of DEMS [Defensively 
Equipped Merchant Ship] gunners, many coasters had difficulty in finding 
accommodation for them.  Bigger coasters like those of Coast Lines could, however, 
find room since they had been designed pre-war to carry a few passengers.   As a 
stop-gap on 27 February 1940, the War Office agreed to supply British Army 
machine gun teams to such vessels on the East Coast run that had suitable 
accommodation and space.  This meant that at places like Southend gunners would 
come aboard carrying Lewis or Bren guns.  The gunners would stay onboard for the 
most dangerous part of the journey as far as Methil where they could be put ashore, 
potentially joining a Forth-South convoy for the return.   
 
Aircraft identification was not a particular speciality of the DEMS gunners on the 
coastal run and convoy reports mention several instances where coasters fired on 
friendly aircraft.  This took different forms with merchant navy crews firing on RAF 
Fighter Command and Coastal Command aircraft from 1939 to 1942.53  Within the 
Royal Navy there was some sympathy for the merchant seamen based on a 
suspicion that RAF pilots did not act in a manner which showed that they understood 
the difficulties facing gun crews on board ship as an aircraft approached.54  As the 
Allied heavy bomber offensive against Germany built up in 1943 and 1944, with the 
skies over the Wash and the East Anglian coast becoming crowded, coastal convoys 
sometimes fired on bomber streams heading to and from Germany.55  Returning the 
favour there are several reports of coastal vessels being near missed by bombs as 
returning aircraft, that had been unable to find their European targets, disposed of 
their payloads before landing. 
 
Coasters : The Crews  
Life on board a coaster was a very different experience to serving on a larger ocean-
going merchant ship.  Coasters were generally dirtier (especially colliers), wetter 
(because of their low freeboard), paid less than ocean-going ships and were more 
rudimentary in terms of facilities.   Jack Prior, able seaman on the West Town 
recounted: ‘When we joined the vessels at the wharf near Tilbury we were told to 
bring our own food and a mattress which was a straw paliase. We worked four hours 
on and four off with five shillings a month in lieu of overtime and a wage of £12 per 
month’.56  One Lieutenant Commander in the Royal Navy, who was also a 
Conservative member in Parliament confessed in 1943: ‘I was shocked when I 
returned to the Navy at the beginning of this war to find that conditions in coastal 
vessels had been practically unaltered, generally speaking, since 1918. In 1943 in 
many vessels a man who wants to wash in hot water has to pull it up in a bucket 
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from the stokehold’.57   Concern about the unsatisfactory nature of conditions on 
coasters did result in limited improvement during the war.  When Everards launched 
MV Supremity in 1944 attention was drawn in several publications to the quality of 
the accommodation provided for the crew.  The fact that this accommodation, by 
any other than that of the pre-war coastal trade, would class as bleak, monastic or 
Spartan only emphasised the awfulness of the conditions experienced by most 
merchant seamen operating in the home trades.58 
 
Small ships required small, tight knit, crews.  The crew of the West Town was small 
even by the standards of the coastal trade: ‘captain, chief officer, two engineers, 
two stokers and two deck hands’.59  A shortage of hands meant that the visual 
signals needed to co-ordinate convoys were often missed, and not passed down the 
columns of merchant ships.  Royal Navy signalmen were placed on some coasters to 
assist the crews.  Even so, on at least one occasion the failure of a coaster to 
maintain an adequate lookout for signals resulted in several rounds being placed 
across her bows to wake up the watch keepers.60 
 
Meals on coasters were often monotonous, and instead of a proper cook, most 
crews shared cooking duties between them. On the other hand, foodstuffs like eggs, 
milk, vegetables could be replenished from ashore every few days whereas ocean 
voyages might last 2 months without fresh stores. A coasting seaman could rely on 
getting medical help for toothache or injury. On short trips coasters might work a 
two-watch system while ocean-going ships worked the less-tiring 3-watch system.  
The skill level demanded of watch keepers on coasting vessels was, at the outbreak 
of war at least, typically lower than that of Deck officers on ocean-going vessels. 
Amongst the merchant navy there was a particularly direct means of expressing the 
differences between ocean-going and coastal masters: ‘They say that when a 
coaster skipper loses sight of the land, he shits himself. When a deep-sea skipper 
sees some land, he too shits himself’.61 
  
The Board of Trade’s Syllabus for 'Home Trade' certificates of competency for 
Masters and Mates had significant differences from that required for 'Foreign-Going' 
certificates.62 For example, the ‘Foreign-Going’ certificate called for much greater 
competence in astral navigation and weather. One seaman later described the 
syllabus for the coasting mate's ticket as less than demanding, requiring ‘little more 
than the ability to read and write, and to distinguish between the sun and the moon 
and one end of a collier from the other’.63 Home Trade Masters and Mates were 
subject to verbal questioning to demonstrate their competency while their Foreign-
Going equivalents were examined in writing and orally.  The situation in the British 
coasting trade in the inter-war period was underlined in 1938 in Parliament when the 
President of the Board of Trade had to respond to questions from MPs about 
undermanned and ill-trained coaster crews.64  Royal Navy reports on the coastal 
convoys, particularly for the early months of the war, routinely feature comments 
about the behaviour and competence of coaster crews.  For example, the Captain of 
HMS Grimsby advised the Captain of the destroyer escort force at Rosyth that ‘very 
few of the ships in the East Coast convoys appear to be able to read a signal of any 
kind’.65  In the circumstances of the Second World War the Board of Trade relaxed 
some of its requirements for masters and mates in the home trade. 
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What the coastal crews did have, however, was the expert knowledge needed to 
navigate in coastal waters with their tides, shoalwaters and currents.  They had a 
familiarity with landmarks and all manner of local peculiarities. Many masters of 
coasters had a very detailed understanding of the waters that their trade forced 
them to ply.  They also had the ship handling skills required to go with that 
knowledge.  Those skills were at a premium during the war, particularly on the East 
Coast where wrecks added to pre-war difficulties of navigating in shallow waters 
along narrow passages. James Goodchild RN Gunner served on MV River Trent 
carrying grain to Norwich  later recalled: ‘you could see shipwrecks all the way down 
from Hull to Yarmouth. They said you could swim the whole way and have a wreck 
to rest on all the way down.’66  Night time navigation of channels swept clear by 
minesweepers was a further challenge for coastal watch keepers. As Alan Burn has 
noted: ‘Once a convoy was outside the maze of the channels among the shoals off 
Norfolk and the mouth of the Thames estuary, the ships crept from one to another 
of the dimly lit buoys which marked the swept channels, though the buoys were 
often either missing or out of position’.67  Storm conditions, or thick fog, in such a 
restricted seaway required shiphandling skills of the very highest order.68 
 
Some of the crews operating on the coastal convoys had to acquire this knowledge 
often from scratch during 1940 and 1941.  These were the crews of the Dutch, 
Norwegian, French vessels that suddenly found themselves pressed into service 
along Britain’s East and South Coasts as part of the Allied merchant fleet.  Later 
American crews had to go through the same process of learning the intricacies of 
the British coast.  Different languages, practices and national mentalities added a 
further complication to the task of marshalling and managing the coastal convoys.69  
Such ships did play a significant role in maintaining Britain’s coastal convoys 
throughout the war making up a significant minority of the ships in any one convoy.  
For example, the 38 ship Convoy FN23, which left Southend on 15 July 1940 
contained 4 Dutch and 2 Norwegian ships.  The ten ship FN73 which arrived in 
Methil on 28 March 1945 comprised 6 British ships, two Norwegians, one Greek and 
one Yugoslav vessel. 
 
In addition to a higher level of ship handling skills coastal crews were forced to 
operate in a different way to larger ships.  An ocean-going master needed to be able 
to deal with government and port regulations anywhere in the world.  He needed to 
understand how to deal with foreign dockers, their trade unions, their religious 
requirements, their habits. He had to be able to use his own judgement far from 
home and in circumstances where communication with head office would take too 
long. The coastal master was much more closely controlled by the shipowners, and 
by a timetable that needed to run irrespective of the weather.  In the circumstances 
of war this sense that coastal crews could operate on the equivalent of a railway 
timetable led to at least one warning in the House of Commons that the Ministry of 
War Transport had to beware the tendency to drive crews too hard by thinking 
about the coastal convoys ‘in terms of railway trains running on rails with a signal 
every half-a-mile’.70 
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The strain of operating in hostile and narrow waters was considerable and it took its 
toll on coaster crews.  The threat of enemy action was ever present, and if attacks 
were rare in comparison to the overall number of sailings then that gave little 
protection against the strain of watching and waiting.71  In the House of Commons 
on 14 July 1943 Lieutenant-Commander Gurney Braithwaite (Conservative, 
Holderness) referred to the ‘signs of strain…. appearing …. [amongst] coastal 
masters and deck hands’.72 Fred Dent gunner on the SS Methilhill recounted in a 
post-war interview that on the coastal convoys there were ‘not a lot of restful 
periods’.73  Occasionally the levels of strain reached the point where complaints 
would be voiced.  When Convoy CW221 was attacked on 4 November 1943 there 
were bitter complaints from the coaster crews that, with just one destroyer and 
lighter craft as escort, that they were little better than sitting ducks.  A minimum 
escort of two destroyers per convoy had become the norm by 1942.74  The loss of 
two merchant vessels from an 18 ship convoy rattled the men on the surviving 
ships.75  The mate of the SS Fulham explained to a security officer that visited his 
ship that as Merchant Navy personnel were being ‘sought for the much talked of 
Second Front [he] personally ... would be only too pleased to take part, as he would 
at least get decent and reasonable protection’.76  There was some recognition of the 
need to address the feelings of vulnerability for coaster crews with C-in-C 
Portsmouth commenting: ‘Although the substance of these reports is from 
imperfectly informed persons they emphasise once again the necessity for additional 
escorting destroyers for Channel convoys’.77  The morale of the mate of the SS 
Fulham did matter and this was tacit acknowledgement that the reserves of bravery 
of the coaster crews was a finite resource. 
 
To the strain of near continuous threat along the coastal convoy route was added 
the knowledge that the detonation of a mine or torpedo was likely to result in 
catastrophic damage to a coaster.  The G7a torpedo, ground and acoustic mines, 
had the capacity to sink a battleship let alone a small coaster.  Carrying a bulk cargo, 
with a small freeboard and large hatches to make the task of unloading that much 
easier, a small coaster could sink very rapidly.  Wooden hatch covers rather than 
steel increased the speed at which a coaster would sink and also increased the 
chances that any explosion would break the vessel in two. 
 
Gallantry awards reflected the problems for coaster crews in any sinking.  Between 
1940 and 1945 the Lloyds War Medal was awarded to eleven merchant seamen 
whose vessels were attacked by S-boats.  Seven of the cases involved the rescue of 
trapped or wounded survivors.78  The massive structural damage sustained by 
coasters following torpedo or mine explosion, and their tendency to sink rapidly 
made for agonising scenes.  When the Free French coaster Daphne (1,970grt) in 
convoy FN34 was torpedoed off the Humber estuary by S-102 at 1am on 18 March 
1941 eight men were initially trapped.  The Donkeyman could not be freed from his 
Cabin and as the crew prepared to abandon ship one shook his hand through an 
open light  ‘and promised to visit his wife and children in France after the war’.79   
 
Coastal Convoys: Organisation and Defence 
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Convoying was instituted on the coastal routes in 1939, but in the early months of 
the war there was some hand ringing within the Royal Navy about whether it was 
actually possible to shepherd the motley collection of ill-disciplined vessels that 
constituted a coastal convoy.  Commodore Davenport RNR commented ‘It appears 
to me very doubtful if the East Coast convoy can turn into a completely organised 
and well drilled convoy for some time’.80     A commodore on one of the first war time 
convoys expressed the hope that station keeping in particular would ‘improve greatly 
with practice’.81  His report otherwise emphasised the problematical nature of 
maintaining discipline and order over coastal vessels and their crews: ‘Station 
keeping of convoy was poor during the first 24 hours… signals had to be made 
constantly  to tell the convoy to keep better station & maintain speed, but, even so, 
the convoy spread and straggled a great deal, especially at night’.82 
 
Partly as a result of the problems during the opening months of the war ships were 
still routed independently around the shores of Britain.  Those independents suffered 
disproportionate losses in the early phases of the war especially from mines.  As the 
official history noted: ‘Of ships sunk by mine in UK coastal waters, three out of every 
four were sailing independently although the bulk of our shipping was in convoy’.83  
The Royal Navy’s confidence in coastal crews grew during 1940 and 1941, but there 
remained particular problem spots.  As Captain Champion (Naval Control Senior 
Officer Thames and Medway) commented to the Admiralty’s Trade Division in 
September 1942: ‘The behaviour of ships ex-Tyne ports is proverbial and no 
conference orders have any effect’.84  References to the ‘Tyne contingent’, ‘Tyne 
flotilla’, ‘Tyne Section’ can be found across the convoy reports for the duration of the 
war.85  Despite the years of practice, Commodores were still complaining about the 
inability of Tyneside colliers to keep station in convoy as late as October 1944.86 
 
Despite the difficulties, convoying kept losses to a minimum, and to supplement it by 
the end of 1939 defensive mine belts had been laid all along the East coast from the 
mouth of the Thames to the Moray Firth.87 The principal purpose of this exercise was 
to keep minelaying u-boats away from the East coast ports and routes.  Between the 
mine belts and the coast, the coastal convoys would run, protected by some 35,000 
contact mines.88  A convoy which might start in Methil with several vessels from a 
trans-Atlantic convoy, would receive and disburse ships from and to Blyth, Tyne, 
Sunderland, Seaham, Tees, Humber, and the East Anglian Ports as it headed south 
towards Southend.89  The narrow corridor along the East coast created by the 
defensive minebelts was further complicated by a network of shoals, and during the 
war it would be further complicated by wrecks.  In peacetime conditions these were 
not the easiest of waters to navigate and in the circumstances of war there were 
considerable difficulties for the management and passage of convoys.  In particular, 
given the route, the coastal convoys were never going to prove difficult to find for a 
determined enemy. Churchill recognised the implications: ‘As it was impossible to 
vary the East Coast route, the passage of each convoy between the Forth and 
London became almost every day an action in itself’.90   
 
Organising and managing the coastal convoys was no easy matter.  Despite hopes 
on the outbreak of war that East coast convoys could be kept down to a size of no 
more than 35 vessels then often numbered in excess of 60.91  Managing such an 
armada meant that Convoy commodores on the coastal runs required rather different 
skills than their deep ocean counterparts. As Alan Burn has explained:  
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Most of the commodores on the coastal convoys were either Commanders or 
Lieutenant Commanders in the Royal Naval Reserve.  In some ways they did 
not have so much freedom of action as the Ocean Commodores, because 
their ships were restricted to narrow corridors and the tails of the columns of 
their convoys were many miles astern, usually out of sight.  Whereas the 
ocean commodore had sea room and could dispose his convoy over a wide 
front and exercise his charges before entering the danger zones, and had 
some chance to manoeuvre and take evasive action when attacked, the 
coastal convoy commodore had no such options.92  
 
Managing convoys that sometimes straggled over an extended area due to 
navigational restrictions was particularly difficult.  Collisions in convoy were frequent, 
which underlined Royal Navy concerns about the quality of seamanship in the 
coastal crews.93  Mechanical problems with older ships were frequent, but at least on 
the coastal run there was usually a safe harbour within easy reach.  Buoys would 
prove hard to find, their lights extinguished or dragged as a result of collision by a 
passing ship and the relay of instructions down the columns of a convoy was often 
disrupted thanks to the shortage of deck officers keeping a lookout. 
 
The problems of managing the coastal convoys were exacerbated during 1943 in the 
D-Day preparation phase by the deployment of larger ships, and a greater variety of 
types. As one Royal Navy veteran commented: ‘Unlike the Ocean Convoys, where 
ships were grouped with those of similar size, speed and turning-circle, the coastals 
contained the lot! Liners converted to troopships, "Liberty Ships", tankers, "flat-iron" 
colliers, small coasters, and tiny, usually Dutch, "scoots" - all with different turning-
circles and handling characteristics, especially in heavy weather’.94  Convoying with 
landing craft was a particular hazard as one merchant seamen found in 1944: ‘On 
one voyage on the Fulham VII we were heading up the English Channel, bound for 
London. This was at night when an invasion craft collided with us. It tore away our 
portside lifeboat, davits, boatfalls, damaged all the bulwarks tore away the portside 
light, no one was hurt thankfully.95 
 
The task of escorting the coastal convoys was particularly problematic.  Following 
heavy losses of destroyers at Dunkirk the Royal Navy struggled to provide sufficient 
escort vessels for the coastal convoys from 1940 to 1942.  The provision of just one 
destroyer as close escort was the norm until late 1941.  To supplement this, smaller 
vessels taken up from trade (usually fishing boats, whalers and drifters) were 
employed as makeshift escorts and minesweepers.  For example, following the 
Dunkirk evacuation a flotilla of Dutch schuytes (fishing boats of approximately 200 
tons) were rapidly fitted with whatever armaments could be spared to be pressed 
into service as Channel escorts under the white ensign using Royal Marine crews.96  
As other vessels suitable for escort work were identified, increasingly they were 
operated by the men of the Royal Navy Patrol Service and crewed predominantly by 
fishermen who had joined the Royal Naval Reserve in the 1930s.  During 1941 these 
meagre forces were supplemented by growing numbers of motor launches and other 
armed light patrol vessels, and by the end of the year it became possible to provide 
two destroyer escorts per convoy.  This was reduced again to one destroyer escort 
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per convoy in early 1943 as a result of the developing offensive in the Mediterranean.  
C-in-C Nore became increasingly eager for the return of the three Hunt Class 
destroyers which had been detached from his command for service in Operation 
Husky (in total 43 Hunt class destroyers were operating in the Mediterranean).97  
Although he did not receive the hunts an additional five town class destroyers were 
found for the Rosyth Command.  By late 1943, as concerns mounted that deliveries 
via coastal convoys under the Bolero plan were ‘lagging behind schedule’, coal 
stocks were estimated to be three weeks below minimum Bolero requirements for 
the Spring of 1944. 98  On 25 November the Naval Staff instructed the commands at 
the Nore, Rosyth and Portsmouth to begin seven day convoying.99  C-in-C Nore 
Command accepted the order only ‘on the understanding that the situation renders it 
essential to accept a considerably increased risk’.100  One representative of the Trade 
Division minuted: ‘I hope that our luck with the East Coast convoys will hold until 
reinforcements are available’.101   
 
In addition to close escorts, the security of the convoy routes depended on 
destroyers patrolling the convoy route or in port along the East and South Coast and 
available for immediate deployment in support of a convoy or to meet a developing 
attack. Standing patrols of aircraft and coastal forces, and increasingly better radar 
coverage of the approaches to the convoy routes, added extra layers of support that 
the men on the coasters were rarely in a position to fully appreciate.  For example, 
the close escort for one East coast northbound convoy, attacked by S-boats on 24-
25 October 1943, was provided by the destroyer HMS Pytchley.  But also at sea in 
support of the convoy were four other destroyers, four motor launches, 9 Motor 
Torpedo Boats and 8 Motor Gun Boats.102 
 
Such defences in depth meant that the Admiralty did indeed get away with providing 
just one major warship as close escort to coastal convoys during late 1943 and early 
1944.  Following D-Day the threat to coastal convoys from S-Boats declined 
markedly (especially after RAF Bomber Command mounted a devastating attack on 
Le Havre on 14 June 1944).  In the late summer of 1944, as Allied forces advanced 
along the coast of the continent, the surviving S-Boats were concentrated in Dutch 
waters making it harder for them to attack convoys running along the East Coast of 
the United Kingdom. As the threat to coastal shipping from S-Boats decreased, that 
from U-boats temporarily increased as the Kriegsmarine mounted a short lived 
campaign in the North Sea and waters around Britain.  Fortunately, losses of 
merchant ships did not mount significantly before the war ended, although that did 




Whatever way they are measured, losses in UK Coastal waters were considerable.  
The collier company Everard’s lost sixteen vessels on the East coast during the war, 
and France Fenwick, a Tyneside based company, lost nine ships in UK coastal 
waters.103 Nick Hewitt has estimated that 1,431 merchant ships were lost in coastal 
waters during the Second World War, totalling 3,768,599 tons’.104  Human casualties 
amounted to something like 3,600 dead amongst the merchant seamen of perhaps 
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twenty nations.105  As J.P. Foynes has put it: ‘Not a Battle of the Atlantic but a severe 
campaign by any other standards’.106  Similar sentiments were expressed during the 
war by the Royal Navy officers tasked with defending the convoys.  Towards the end 
of 1942 C-in-C Nore estimated that between the start of the war and 14 November 
63,350 transits of the East Coast passage had been made by merchant ship.  A total 
of 157 merchant ships had been lost as a result of enemy action (0.24% of the total 
number of sailings).  He expressed some satisfaction with the figure: ‘these losses 
cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as excessive, and compare, I believe, favourably 
with other convoys sailing through dangerous waters’.107   Despite these successes 
the Royal Navy remained anything but complacent.  In October 1943, at the start of 
the Winter convoy battles, and influenced by the inadequate number of escorts at his 
disposal, C-in-C Nore wrote to their Lordships of the Admiralty to demand further 
resources.  He commented ‘I consider the extraordinarily small losses which have 
taken place over recent months must be attributed principally to good fortune and 
lack of enterprise on the part of the enemy’.108  He warned ‘These two factors cannot 
be expected to continue indefinitely’.  The Coastal Convoys were in many ways the 
poor relation of the bigger struggle taking place in the Atlantic.  In late 1943 C-in-C 
Rosyth expressed grave concerns about the lack of available escorts: ‘while every 
effort is being made to win the Battle of the Atlantic and considerable success is 
being attained in bringing convoys safely to West coast ports, I view with alarm their 
passage up and down the East coast unprotected save by a single destroyer’.109 
 
In strategic terms the successful defence of the coastal convoy routes was just as 
vital as success in the Battle of the Atlantic.  At the height of Allied preparations for 
D-Day in 1944 coastal convoys were carrying roughly 10% by weight of all goods 
being moved within the United Kingdom.110  That may seem like a comparatively 
small figure, but in reality without the coastal convoys there would have been 
considerable impacts on port operation, shipping availability and the ability of the 
inland transport network to cope with the demands of war. By the end of the war 21 
million tons of coal had been delivered by coastal convoy, together with 9 million 
tons of general cargo.111  Despite such achievements, while the convoy struggles in 
the Atlantic are celebrated, the coastal convoys have been largely forgotten.  The 
merchant seamen who took part in them were, at least in the early stages of the war, 
a rather different breed to those who ventured further afield.  Their conditions of 
service were generally poorer and their skills rather different.  The experiences of 
merchant seamen on the coastal convoys differed in some significant respects from 
those on the Atlantic run.  The danger of attack on the East and South coasts was 
near constant, and while the threat from submarines was significantly less that from 
S-boats, mines and aircraft was considerably enhanced.  The damage suffered by a 
smaller ship from an explosion was likely to be significantly greater than for a larger 
vessel.  While a coaster might sink more rapidly, crew were more likely to be able to 
launch rafts and boats from vessels with low freeboards.  Men in the water stood a 
good chance of either being able to make shore or a rescue vessel.  The provision of 
motor launches to cover convoys was especially useful in this respect.  There would 
be no epic survival voyages for the men on the coastal convoys.  While the men on 
the Atlantic convoys during the war had good reason to feel undervalued by the 
nation whose vital supplies they brought-in, the men on the coasters perhaps had 
even greater grounds to feel that they were unloved and uncelebrated.  They also 
had good reason to feel comparatively defenceless against the enemy.  In the close 
waters of the English Channel close convoy escort could not operate effectively 
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against S-Boats and they could do little to stop mines and aircraft.   For their security 
the coastal convoys relied by late 1941 on a complex defence in depth which started 
with offensive patrols, involved a standing patrol line together with close escort 
(which was rarely that close given the need for convoys to proceed in extended lines 
through the shallows and shoals).  The merchant seamen on the coasters could take 
little comfort in this defence in depth which was rarely visible to them.  From the 
surviving evidence there is a strong sense that coaster crews felt exposed – almost 
undefended at times.  One can occasionally glimpse the effects of the psychological 
strain of running regular convoys in dangerous waters where the only visible 
protection might appear to be that offered by on-board DEMS gunners, perhaps an 
old destroyer or converted fishing vessel manned by the Royal Naval Patrol Service, 
and a couple of motor launches.  While the Battle of the Atlantic turned decisively 
against the Kriegsmarine in early 1943, the coastal waters around the UK and in the 
North Sea were still being contested by S-Boats and U-Boats in the closing days of 
the war.  The coastal convoy battles are a powerful reminder that while the U-boat 
came to dominate the war at sea it was always the intention that Britain’s commerce 
would be degraded by submarines, surface ships and aircraft operating together.  
The experience of merchant seamen on the coastal convoys offers us the occasional 
glimpse of what life might have been like in the Atlantic if German naval preparations 
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